

Evaluating the factors that influence protest participation via Facebook: a study of the 2020 #EndSARS protest in Nigeria

  **Chinedu Eugenia Anumudu**

Department of Mass Communication,
Baze University,
Jabi, Abuja, Nigeria

 **Ifeanyi Harris**

Department of Mass Communication,
Baze University,
Jabi, Abuja, Nigeria

 **Ememobong Idongesit Memfin**

Department of Mass Communication,
Baze University,
Jabi, Abuja, Nigeria

Abstract

Social media platforms play a massive role in driving 21st century protests. While networks like Twitter are widely recognized as primary catalysts for political activism, empirical quantitative data remains limited regarding Facebook's ability to mobilize physical protest turnout in Nigeria. To address this critical academic gap, this study investigated how sharing specific content on Facebook, such as police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and protest situational reports, correlates with actual participation in the historic 2020 End Special Anti-Robbery Squad (#EndSARS) movement in Nigeria. Using a survey-based quantitative design, the study analysed statistical relationships across a broad sample to ensure the insights accurately reflect the larger target population. The findings reveal that sharing situational reports and clear evidence of police victimisation significantly expands active demonstrations by drawing more citizens to active protests. Conversely, sharing stories about economic grievances showed no meaningful connection to immediate physical turnout. Based on these insights, the study recommends careful platform moderation during active civic unrest to discourage highly inflammatory posts that rapidly worsen conflicts. Ultimately, this specific research offers a fresh perspective on digital activism, proving that Facebook is an essential catalyst for modern social movements.

Keywords: Facebook, #EndSARS, Nigeria, quantitative design, protest participation

1. Introduction

In this digital era, social media platforms have proven to be among the most effective tools for mobilising individuals virtually for a collective cause. Despite their numerous standard roles, such as facilitating socialisation and information circulation, these platforms serve as prominent catalysts for social movements and prompt people to take physical action (Abimbade et al., 2022; Frank, 2022). This stands in stark contrast to more individualised digital tools like email, where research shows that social integrative needs have no significant impact on communication satisfaction, which is instead driven heavily by personal motives (Anumudu et al., 2021). Consequently, understanding how a collective, socially-driven platform like Facebook bridges this gap is critical to evaluating modern protest mobilisation.

Beyond individual connections, these platforms are deployed globally to instigate public protests and mobilise citizens en masse (Taha, 2023). However, the specific strategic approaches through which they are leveraged vary significantly by region. For example, social media can be used for expressing political views, managing grassroots activities, and updating individuals outside core organisations during a movement (Kamaruzzaman, 2022). The Lebanese public, for instance, employed these networks to enlighten citizens during the country's revolutionary crises (Kairouz & Dagher, 2020). This highlights how digital networks function as vital communication channels during periods of intense civil demonstration.

In addition to being utilised for disseminating real-time information during social movements, social media platforms serve as a primary means of framing structural political issues, alongside wider social and cultural crises (Xu & Zhang, 2024). Opposition political parties have similarly maximised these outlets to pilot their grievances, using them to invigorate organizational capacities and drive mobilisation when necessitated (Houeland, 2020). Notwithstanding the benefits of using social media platforms for positive mobilisation during demonstrations, they can also be used negatively to escalate civil unrest, especially when deliberate situational reports are posted by protesters from their various locations. To achieve the goals of a protest, prominent platforms such as Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter are maximised by agitators to promote the events of social movements. This dynamic was clearly demonstrated by Nigerian youths during the historic #EndSARS demonstrations, which called for the disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (Bodunrin & Matsilele, 2024; Nwafor & Nwabuzor, 2021). These platforms are frequently exploited when there is a strategic need to position a threatening situation and agitate for fundamental rights (Labben, 2022). Similar scenarios are regularly evidenced in Nigeria whenever protest cases arise, even when the immediate circumstances may not be the root causes of the ongoing unrest (Abimbade et al., 2022; Maradun et al., 2021). For example, protesters could exploit economic situation updates, even though these issues are not the foundational cause of a specific gathering, simply to solicit more participants and thereby escalate the protest. To buttress this point, it was witnessed during the Oduduwa group protests in Nigeria that agitators were instigated by baseless generalisations, victimisation, and targeted individual or group polarisation broadcast across social media platforms (Aminu & Chiluwa, 2023).

Given the potential benefits and risks of using social media to share information during crises, it is vital to understand the precise categories of information that prompted thousands of individuals to join the 2020 #EndSARS protest. The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) was originally established as a specialized branch of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and was mandated to address matters of armed robbery, kidnapping, and related criminalities across Nigerian states. The #EndSARS protest is arguably one of the modern demonstrations that has gained the most remarkable attention globally. The physical protest took place in Nigeria on Thursday, 8 October 2020, as a provoked reaction to systemic police victimisation (Iwuoha & Aniche, 2022). However, what started as a localized movement to eradicate specific forms of institutional menace rapidly became a massive catalyst for protest in Nigeria's recent history. Multiple accounts, both from official reports and online platforms, detailing the unruly activities of SARS were severely exacerbated by a viral video showing the brutal shooting of a young Nigerian whom the squad suspected to be an armed robber. This event was alleged to have taken place at the Wetland Hotel in Ughelli, Delta State, and was shared widely on social media on 4 October 2020 (Blessing et al., 2021). This viral video is widely conceived as the direct trigger for the nationwide protest that drew citizens onto the streets of multiple Nigerian states and sparked intense online debates across the globe.

While social media has been firmly established as a catalyst for this unrest, specific issues, such as users sharing police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and live situational reports to draw more participation, have increasingly attracted the attention of contemporary scholars. Consequently, it remains critical to explore whether these distinct information types served as the core triggers for joining and escalating the movement (Adeniyi, 2022; Dim, 2023; Uwalaka et al., 2023). Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the statistical relationships between sharing these specific content types on social media and actual protest participation. To address the existing empirical gap, this study focuses explicitly on Facebook users

and platforms, given that the majority of previous related studies have been strictly limited to alternative networks such as Twitter (Bodunrin & Matsilele, 2024).

Furthermore, previous researchers who have employed framing theory to study similar socio-political issues have faced distinct methodological limitations, as they relied almost exclusively on qualitative content analyses (Omeni, 2022; Ugochukwu et al., 2021). Consequently, their findings lacked empirical generalisability. There is a clear academic need to quantitatively explore the perceptions of Facebook users regarding these identified factors to determine whether sharing such information significantly influences active participation, which forms the core justification for this correlation study. Given the potential generalisability benefits of this research, it is vital to gain an enhanced understanding of the underlying mechanisms through a structured quantitative approach.

This study, therefore, aims to determine whether correlations exist between sharing police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and protest situational reports on Facebook, and actual protest participation. It is believed that the outcomes of this study will help social media users to decisively evaluate their choices when faced with the option of joining a social movement blindly due to the specific posts they encounter online. To answer this overarching question and fill the identified empirical gap, this study aims to achieve the following specific research objectives:

1. To profile the descriptive characteristics and distribution patterns of the three Facebook sharing behaviours (police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and protest situational reports) and #EndSARS protest participation.
2. To ascertain whether there is a correlation between sharing police victimisation scenes on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.
3. To evaluate whether there is a correlation between sharing economic hardship scenarios on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.
4. To examine whether there is a correlation between sharing protest situational reports on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.
5. To determine the extent of influence sharing police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and protest situational reports have on #EndSARS protest participation.

To achieve the objectives stated above, the following research hypotheses were formulated and will be tested at $\alpha = .01$ level of significance

- H₁: There is a significant correlation between sharing police victimisation scenes on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.
- H₂: There is a significant correlation between sharing economic hardship scenarios on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.
- H₃: There is a significant correlation between sharing protest situational reports on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.
- H₄: Facebook sharing behaviours (police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and protest situational reports) significantly influence #EndSARS protest participation.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Sharing Police Victimization Scenes and Protest Participation

Police victimisation remains one of the salient realities that have garnered societal remonstrance in the 21st century. Despite the dimension of these arguments, the consensus indicates that it poses a growing challenge to social harmony (Girardi, 2022; Stanek et al., 2023). The hydra-headed nature of police victimisation makes it difficult to arrive at a unified conceptualisation; thus, scholars approach it from different perspectives. Arguing from a racial viewpoint, Stinson et al. (2021) highlight evidence of racial disparities in the use of police force, including situations involving noncustodial encounters, physical restraints, taser deployment, and victimisation in fatal police shootings. Conversely, Simmler et al. (2021) argue that police officers are often the victims rather than the culprits of victimisation, noting that policing is one of the most dangerous and stressful occupations. This is because the role involves multiple inherent risks that consequently produce high rates of occupational victimisation. While these varying opinions are acknowledged, the broader concept of police victimisation resonates heavily with the realities of dehumanisation, which ultimately acts as a catalyst for public action.

The dawn of social media amplified the realities of the police victimisation scene, making it a catalyst for protest mobilisation. Hence, police victimisation scenes have been identified as one of the primary triggers that elicit protest participation (Lu & Peng, 2024). The effect of social media on protest participation, especially when users encounter police victimisation videos, is widely acknowledged. Establishing the role of social media in circulating such videos, Lavender and Peetz (2022) argue that although sometimes decried as 'merely performative' or superficial, social media remains a major force and facilitator of contemporary protest. This argument provides critical insight into the capacity of social media to mobilise individuals for protest movements. Valenzuela et al. (2020) expand on this perspective by identifying social media platforms like Facebook as highly effective channels for driving protest participation. According to Valenzuela et al. (2020), Facebook efficiently promotes engagement by providing the social pressure and reinforcement needed to engage in high-risk, time-consuming actions such as street demonstrations, which are interactions typically fostered within strong-tie networks. While Valenzuela et al. established the potency of Facebook as a catalyst for protest participation, Duncombe (2020) identified both still and motion images as central mechanisms through which the platform mobilises the public. The scholar further illustrated that billions of images and videos (such as photos, cartoons, GIFs, and short video clips) are exchanged by users across platforms to facilitate or elicit participation, especially on notable sites like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. Facebook is of specific interest to this study due to the empirical attention it has received regarding global protest participation. Acknowledged as one of the social media platforms with the largest user bases, particularly in developing countries, Facebook is considered a vital catalyst for protest participation compared to its digital counterparts (Abdullahi et al., 2022; Azab, 2023; Kim, 2020; Urman et al., 2021).

Even though Facebook has been established as one of the tools that played significant roles in the #EndSARS protest, the extent to which it played this role is still a matter of inquiry (Aboh, 2024). Hence, the need to underscore the relationship between sharing police victimisation scenes and protest participation becomes imperative. Prominent among the significance of this study is its ability to respond to the question of the extent to which Facebook mobilised people for #EndSARS protest participation (Olzak, 2021; Iwuoha & Aniche, 2022). Therefore, the study hypothesizes that:

H₁: There is a significant correlation between sharing police victimisation scenes on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.

2.2. Sharing Economic Hardship Scenarios on Facebook and Protest Participation

Economic hardship is a global reality, even though the degree may differ, especially when developing countries in Africa are considered. Asiamah (2024) concurs that economic hardships resulting from macroeconomic crises are experienced differently by developing countries where State welfare support is limited. Defined as diverse forms of deprivation arising from financial distress, economic hardship manifests itself in different ways. However, a common factor that has elicited widespread academic debate is its ability to function as a catalyst for protest participation (Jungkunz, 2024; Zharima et al., 2024). Affirming the role of economic hardship in driving protests, Oana et al. (2024) hold that when austerity and economic hardship rose, protests became ubiquitous across Europe, even in unusual cases. Other scholars not only concur regarding the nexus between economic hardships and protest mobilisation, but they also expand on the arguments by discussing how social media amplifies economic hardship, thereby leading to protest participation. In fact, Brantly (2019) notes that the impact of social media on revolutions has grown significantly in importance in recent years.

Furthermore, Scherman and Rivera (2021) deepened the arguments of Brantly by emphasising that social media has been particularly important for understanding the participation of citizens in protests around the world. Thus, the scholars argued that social media does not elicit protest participation in a vacuum, but rather depends on other societal factors. According to Lee and Ahmed (2024), limited theoretical attention has been paid to how social media interacts with other critical drivers of protest engagement, such as political efficacy and economic status. Furthering the arguments of Lee and Ahmed, this study intends to explore whether there is a connection between sharing economic hardship scenarios on Facebook during a protest period and actual protest participation.

Additionally, Uwalaka and Nwala (2023) affirm that many socio-political protest studies have uncovered that social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter can facilitate protest participation when used to share updates during protests. While studies on the relationship between social media posting and protest participation are acknowledged, a paucity of research exists regarding the relationship between posting economic hardship scenarios on Facebook and actual protest participation. Consequently, this study is imperative because it provides insight into the relationship between posting economic hardship scenarios on Facebook and protest participation, which addresses the question of how Facebook elicits protest participation. Therefore, the #EndSARS protest underscores the need to evaluate the potency of social media, especially Facebook, in mobilising protest participation (Olagunju et al., 2022). With the #EndSARS protest in view, this study attempts to investigate the potency of sharing economic hardship scenarios on Facebook during a protest period. The current study, therefore, postulates that:

H₂: There is a significant correlation between sharing economic hardship scenarios on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.

2.3. Sharing Protest Situational Reports on Facebook and Protest Participation

Protests are dynamic, either planned or spontaneous, and build momentum as they unfold over time. Today, providing real-time situational reports is no longer the sole responsibility of traditional media, as protesters increasingly use platforms like Facebook to share updates. However, the reliability of these crowd-sourced reports remains a subject of intense debate. For instance, Mercea et al. (2024) argue that not all social media updates are validated, pointing out that many updates are either about minor issues or old events that are already over.


Historically, one of the key reasons traditional media channels like newspapers ranked higher than television networks during crises is because print media was mobile. In the contemporary digital landscape, this mobility implies that the target audience can access updates about ongoing protests anywhere, instantly share them on Facebook, and occasionally exaggerate them. This rapid dissemination heavily influences the disposition of Facebook users during protests. The arguments of Adegbola et al. (2022) establish the potency of situational reports in shaping protest outlooks, especially regarding human disposition. They also propose that news reporting significantly aids audiences in the formation of attitudes and opinions about ongoing incidents.

Furthermore, Stamps and Mastro (2020) buttress the argument of Adegbola et al. (2022) by highlighting how the format of a protest's situational report elicits a participatory reaction from the audience. According to Stamps and Mastro, visual images appear to play a dominant role over text in determining behavioural responses, with anger and fear mediating this relationship. Having established the pertinence of situational reports, the issues of media ownership and access to information mirror the impact of social media in changing the face of crisis communication. Social media is currently revolutionising protest situational reports. Susánszky et al. (2022) examined the temporal dimension of social media communication and the concept of 'real-time'. This term describes media platforms characterised by fresh, dynamic, or continuously processed content. Therefore, individuals who are eyewitnesses or active protesters can post situational reports that transform from mere updates into catalysts for protest participation.

In this regard, Facebook is one of the primary social media platforms that allow citizens to report situational updates, a dynamic that was clearly evident during the #EndSARS protest. While discussing the effect of Facebook on the #EndSARS protest, Uwalaka (2023) affirms that using Facebook for protest documentation is the second strongest predictor of documenting participation and joining on the first day of the protest, with an odds ratio of 4.72. This brings to the fore the need to understand the extent to which Facebook mobilises individuals for protest participation. As one of the most efficient platforms widely used by Nigerians, posting situational reports on Facebook was a primary mechanism for raising awareness about the #EndSARS protest. However, whether a connection exists between sharing protest situational reports on Facebook and actual protest participation has not been sufficiently studied. Consequently, this study hypothesises that:

H₃: There is a significant relationship between sharing protest situational reports on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation.

Figure 1: Analytical Model of Facebook Content Sharing and Protest Participation



3. Theoretical Framework

Framing theory underpins this study because it addresses the relationship between message presentation, internalisation, and audience choice. The theory provides insight into how messages are structured to attract audience attention, particularly within information environments where multiple messages consistently compete for public engagement. Bullock and Shulman (2021) concur that, as a message design strategy, framing refers to the strategic presentation of information in a manner that draws attention toward certain aspects of an issue while simultaneously drawing attention away from others. Consequently, applying framing theory requires examining both the specific issues being framed and the communication strategies deployed in that framing. Framing theory gained widespread academic prominence after Erving Goffman published his foundational book, *Frame Analysis*, in 1974, which applied the concept of framing to everyday communication situations. Its unique capacity to provide insight into why disseminated messages elicit specific behaviours and actions makes framing theory highly suitable for this investigation. Kuan et al. (2021) elaborate that framing goes a step further by explaining how an issue is presented, proposing that the media focus on specific events and subsequently place them within a distinct field of meaning. Prior studies have widely acknowledged the structural effects of framing and how it influences public activism, particularly when reports of demonstrations are brought to the fore. For instance, Harlow and Brown (2022) observe that journalistic reporting can stifle collective action by depicting protests as inherently disruptive or by ignoring them entirely. Brown and Mourão (2022) build directly upon the arguments of Harlow and Brown by discussing the cause-and-effect dynamics of media framing. According to Brown and Mourão (2022), mainstream news consumption, though producing predominantly delegitimising coverage, can still correlate with increased public support for social movements like Black Lives Matter. While these foundational studies focused primarily on traditional media houses, this study pivots toward alternative media environments. Specifically, it explores the relationships between sharing police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and protest situational reports on social media platforms, such as Facebook, and actual protest participation. Consequently, this study argues that the framing of protests on social media holds the distinct potential to elicit physical protest participation, depending heavily on the specific issues being framed and the grassroots strategies deployed in disseminating that information. By acknowledging the revolutionising effect of social media on contemporary journalism, this study expands on the operational effects of framing. It highlights the potential that user-generated posts on Facebook have when framing critical issues, such as police victimisation, economic hardship scenarios, and live protest situational reports. The digital

presentation of live stories and real-time events during the #EndSARS protest by ordinary citizens on Facebook serves as the primary premise for evaluating active protest dynamics and the broader socio-political effect of Facebook posting (Uwalaka & Nwala, 2023). Hence, this study maintains that a direct relationship exists between the digital portrayal of certain dominant societal issues on Facebook and physical protest participation.

4. Methodology

This study uses a quantitative method to achieve its objectives and test hypotheses regarding Facebook engagement and protest participation. Specifically, it examines the correlations between the sharing of police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and protest situational reports on Facebook and actual protest participation. A quantitative approach is appropriate here because this study relies on statistical quantification. Ultimately, inferential analysis enables hypothesis testing and generalisation across the target population (Kumari et al., 2023).

The key variables in this study were measured using questions adapted from previous scholarly works. To measure the sharing of police victimisation scenes, 10 items were adapted from Kim (2023), whose study explored media consumption, police victimisation, and public discernment of safety. Sample items from this scale include, 'I regularly repost videos and images showing scenes of police victimisation on my Facebook accounts,' and, 'When I see an online video of someone being victimised by police, I actively forward or post it to Facebook to raise awareness among my friends.'

To examine the sharing of economic hardship scenarios on Facebook, nine questions were adapted from Jachimowicz et al. (2020) and Sun et al. (2022). These sources explored economic inequalities and their intensification of financial hardship, alongside household financial abilities and economic hardship. Examples of these adapted statements include, 'I share posts on Facebook about my household's economic hardship,' and, 'I post on Facebook about how inequality worsens economic hardship.'

Regarding the sharing of protest situational reports on Facebook, 10 questions were adapted from scholars who previously investigated social media and protest enlistment, as well as social media utilisation and pathways to protest involvement (Breuer et al., 2015; Scherman & Rivera, 2021). Sample items include, 'I regularly share real-time protest situational reports on Facebook to help others coordinate and navigate active demonstration sites,' and, 'When traditional media coverage is limited, I post protest situational reports on Facebook to inform my friends about what is actually happening on the ground.'

Finally, protest participation was measured using 10 questions adapted from Kwak (2022), whose study examined protest potential partaking through a survey data recycling framework. Items measuring this variable include, 'I have actively attended or taken part in public demonstrations or protest marches in the past,' and, 'I am willing to participate in public demonstrations or protest marches in the future if a social issue matters to me.'

The study population comprised undergraduate students at Bingham University, a private university in Nasarawa State, Nigeria, who followed updates on the #EndSARS protest via Facebook. According to records

from the institution's students' affairs unit, the total student population was 3,000. A sample size of 353 was determined using the Yamane formula, $n = N / (1 + Ne^2)$ as demonstrated by Uakarn et al. (2021).

Data for this study were generated through an online survey questionnaire distributed via digital platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, and email, which was methodologically superior to face-to-face distribution for this specific research. Since the study evaluates the extent to which digital content on Facebook mobilised or incentivised individuals to take part in physical street protests, sampling respondents within their native digital environment guaranteed that every participant was an active social media user directly exposed to the 2020 #EndSARS updates. Consequently, the target population strictly comprised undergraduate students at Bingham University who followed protest updates via Facebook.

To achieve the target sample size of 353, the study utilised a combination of purposive and convenience sampling techniques. This approach was purposive because it strictly targeted undergraduate students at Bingham University who met the criteria of active social media usage during the 2020 protests. To reach these respondents, the open-access survey link was broadcast and pinned within high-traffic institutional student e-forums, Facebook groups, and WhatsApp chats, remaining live and monitored daily until exactly 353 fully completed responses were digitally recorded in the database.

Strict ethical guidelines and data privacy protocols were maintained throughout this digital process. The researchers did not harvest or independently access a private database of respondents' social media handles or contact details; email addresses were only provided voluntarily by respondents within the form to validate submissions and prevent duplicate entries. Furthermore, the survey's landing page served as an Informed Consent Form detailing the study's academic purpose and guaranteeing absolute anonymity. To enforce strict eligibility, the form included a mandatory screening mechanism: only respondents who explicitly checked that they followed the protest updates via Facebook and were willing to participate were allowed to proceed, while those who indicated they did not follow the updates were automatically barred from filling out the questionnaire.

Both the descriptive parts and the three correlation objectives were analysed via the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). However, before arriving at the hypotheses of the study, a reliability test was run among the four variables to ascertain the internal consistency of the collected data. The outcomes, as presented in Table 1, showed that the four variables were highly reliable. This was evidenced by their Cronbach's alpha values; specifically, all Cronbach's alpha values were greater than .70, as demonstrated by Sarstedt et al. (2019).

Furthermore, the data were analysed quantitatively using statistical software. For all hypothesis testing, the significance threshold was set at a conservative level of $\alpha = .01$, rather than the conventional social science baseline of (.05). This stringent cutoff was chosen to account for the study's moderately large sample size ($N = 353$). With a sample exceeding 300, a standard (.05) threshold can artificially inflate statistical power and flag weak or trivial relationships as significant (Lakens et al., 2018; Miller & Ulrich, 2019). Restricting the alpha level to ($\alpha = .01$) minimises the risk of Type I errors (false positives), ensuring that only highly robust and meaningful correlation dynamics are reported.

Table 1: Variables' reliability outcomes

Variables	Numbers of items	Cronbach Alpha
Sharing Protest Situational Reports	10	.91
Sharing Police Victimization Scenes	10	.79
Sharing Economic Hardship Scenarios	9	.76
Protest Participation	10	.86

Source: authors' own elaboration

5. Results and Discussion

This section presents and discusses the findings of the study; however, before proceeding to the findings of the individual objectives, the demographic factors of the respondents are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 establishes a critical baseline for understanding the sample population, which consists entirely of active Facebook users who monitored the #EndSARS protest updates on the platform. The distribution across gender, age, marital status, and academic level reflects specific socio-cultural dynamics that influence digital activism and media consumption patterns within the Nigerian higher education ecosystem.

The data reveal a pronounced gender asymmetry, with females accounting for 72.2% ($n = 255$) of the sample, whilst males constitute only 27.8% ($n = 98$). In the context of Nigerian higher education and digital activism, this overwhelming female representation is highly significant. Historically, traditional public spheres and street protests in Nigeria have been male-dominated due to safety concerns and patriarchal socio-cultural norms (Olaitan, 2024). However, the digital sphere democratises participation. This high female turnout in the online sample suggests that social media platforms like Facebook served as a safe, accessible, and egalitarian space for female students to engage with the #EndSARS movement. As highlighted by Olaitan (2024), digital spaces offered a layer of physical anonymity and security, allowing women to actively participate in political discourse and express solidarity without facing the immediate threats of state violence and physical harassment present on the streets.

The age distribution is heavily concentrated in the emerging adulthood bracket, with 61.5 per cent of respondents aged between 18 and 20 years ($n = 217$), and a combined 87.6% falling between 18 and 23 years. Conversely, early adolescents aged 15 to 17 represent 10.5% ($n = 37$), whilst those under 15 constitute a negligible 2.0% ($n = 7$). This concentration aligns precisely with scholarly consensus on the demographic profile of the #EndSARS movement, which was fundamentally a youth-led uprising driven by "Generation Z" and young millennials (Aboh, 2024). The predominance of undergraduate students aged 18 to 23 indicates that the study captured the exact demographic segment most aggrieved by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) profiling, which frequently targeted young Nigerians based on their age and technology ownership. It confirms that the sample represents the primary digitally literate cohort capable of leveraging social media architectures for rapid socio-political mobilisation (Aboh, 2024).

An overwhelming majority of the respondents are single, accounting for 94.1% ($n = 332$) of the sample, compared to just 5.9% who are married ($n = 21$). Marital status heavily influences time allocation, civic priorities, and digital habits. Unmarried university students typically possess greater temporal flexibility and

fewer domestic responsibilities than their married peers. This high proportion of single respondents explains the intensive digital engagement with the protest updates. These individuals possessed the discretionary time required to track rapidly evolving online narratives, share digital content, and participate in continuous online discourses, a phenomenon well-documented in studies concerning student political engagement during crises (Olanrewaju et al., 2024).

The distribution across academic levels shows that the sample is dominated by mid-to-late-stage undergraduates. Students in their 200 level comprise 32.6% ($n = 115$) and 300 level students account for 36.5% ($n = 129$), collectively making up 69.1% of the cohort. First-year students at the 100 level represent a minor 7.9% ($n = 28$), whilst final-year or professional-track students at the 400 and 500 levels constitute 18.7% ($n = 66$) and 4.2% ($n = 15$) respectively. The concentration of 200 and 300 level students suggests a sample that has successfully acclimated to the university environment, possesses established peer networks, and exhibits the cognitive maturity necessary to engage with complex political topics like state-sanctioned violence and governance reform. According to Agbiboa (2022), mid-level undergraduates are often at the peak of their campus associational life, making them highly susceptible to peer influence and collective digital action during national events.

Table 2: Respondents' demographic factors

Demographic profile	Frequency	Percentage(s)
Gender		
Male	98	27.8
Female	255	72.2
Age		
<15	7	2.00
15-17	37	10.5
18-20	217	61.5
21-23	62	17.6
>23	30	8.5
Marital Status		
Single	332	94.1
Married	21	5.9
Level of Study		
100 level	28	7.9
200 level	115	32.6
300 level	129	36.5
400 level	66	18.7
500 level	15	4.2
Do you have a Facebook account?		
Yes	353	100
No	-	-
Did you follow up updates on the #EndSARS protest via Facebook?		
Yes	353	100
No	-	-

Source: authors' own elaboration

A critical finding is the absolute homogeneity regarding Facebook ownership and protest tracking, with 100% ($n = 353$) of the respondents affirming both parameters. In quantitative research, zero variance in baseline variables indicates a highly filtered sample. This perfect uniformity confirms that Facebook was not merely a secondary communication channel, but a primary informational infrastructure for university students during the crisis. The data underscores the platform's role as a pervasive, real-time news source that bridged the gap between physical protests and student observers, ensuring total informational saturation among the sampled population. This aligns with the observations of Obia (2023), who noted that amid media censorship or mainstream broadcast gaps during the protests, social media platforms became the exclusive, trusted repositories for alternative public updates.

To establish a baseline for the data, the first objective analysis examined the descriptive patterns and averages across the sample population ($N = 353$). All variables were measured on a standard scale ranging from 1.00 to 5.00, as presented in Table 3.

Among the Facebook sharing habits, sharing police victimisation scenes was clearly the most dominant behaviour, recording the highest average score ($M = 4.37$), ($SD = 0.69$). The low standard deviation shows that participants exhibited low variance in frequently posting these graphic scenes. Sharing protest situational reports emerged as the second most frequent activity ($M = 3.91$), ($SD = 0.87$), indicating strong user engagement with real-time updates. By contrast, sharing economic hardship scenarios was the least active factor ($M = 3.18$), ($SD = 1.14$). The higher standard deviation indicates that responses regarding economic struggles were much more divided and spread out.

For the dependent variable, active #EndSARS protest participation recorded a high baseline average ($M = 3.93$), ($SD = 0.98$). This indicates that the sampled individuals were deeply involved in the movement. Taken together, these descriptive statistics demonstrate that online engagement with police brutality and real-time protest tracking were far more central to this sample than discussions surrounding economic hardships.

Table 3: Descriptive analysis of the study's variables

Variable	Number of items	Min	Max	Mean (M)	Std. Deviation (SD)
Sharing Police Victimisation	10	1.00	5.00	4.37	0.69
Sharing Economic Hardship scenarios	9	1.00	5.00	3.18	1.14
Sharing Protest Situational Reports	10	1.00	5.00	3.91	0.87
#EndSARS Protest Participation	10	1.00	5.00	3.93	0.98

Source: authors' own elaboration

The second research objective evaluated the first hypothesis regarding the correlation between sharing police victimisation scenes on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation. As demonstrated in Table 4, the statistical outcome indicates that H1 is supported ($r = .742$, $p < .01$), establishing a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between these variables. This outcome demonstrates that exposure

to the digital documentation of police brutality acts as a potent behavioural driver. Specifically, Facebook users are heavily motivated to transition from online observation to physical protest participation when graphic scenes of citizens experiencing state-sanctioned violence are circulated. This finding aligns with the scholarly framework of Lu and Peng (2024), who identified the digital documentation of police victimisation as a primary emotional and moral catalyst for rapid protest mobilisation. Furthermore, this result extends the empirical assertions of Lavender and Peetz (2022), who characterised mainstream social media architectures, particularly Facebook, as highly effective structural conduits for coordinating and accelerating civic resistance. Based on these dynamics, this study recommends the implementation of targeted platform content moderation and ethical user guidelines regarding the dissemination of highly distressing or violent media during national crises, thereby balancing public awareness against the potential escalation of volatile societal unrest.

The third objective analysed the second hypothesis regarding whether a correlation exists between sharing economic hardship scenarios on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation. The empirical analysis presented in Table 4 ($r = .387$, $p > .01$) indicates that H2 was not supported, demonstrating that the positive relationship between the two variables failed to reach statistical significance at the chosen strict threshold. This finding implies that the digital sharing of economic grievances or macroeconomic distress on Facebook does not serve as a primary behavioural trigger capable of propelling users to join the #EndSARS movement. Consequently, these results align partially with the structural perspectives of Asiamah (2024), who demonstrated that economic hardships stemming from systemic fiscal crises are experienced heterogeneously across demographic segments in developing countries. Conversely, this study provides an empirical counterpoint to the broader theoretical claims made by Jungkunz (2024) as well as Zharima et al. (2024), who illustrated that financial distress commonly functions as a universal catalyst for mass political action. Within the specific parameters of the Nigerian socio-political landscape, this finding demonstrates that generalised economic dissatisfaction, when mediated via social networks, was insufficient to independently trigger active protest participation.

The fourth research objective evaluated the third hypothesis regarding whether a correlation exists between sharing protest situational reports on Facebook and #EndSARS protest participation. The statistical evidence presented in Table 4 ($r = .681$, $p < .01$) confirms that H3 is fully supported, indicating that a robust, positive, and significant relationship exists between the sharing of real-time situational updates on Facebook and active participation in the #EndSARS campaign. This implies that eyewitness accounts, live logistical updates, and situational reporting posted directly from the protest grounds by active demonstrators function as immediate mobilising vectors. When external Facebook users encounter these real-time informational streams, the barrier to entry is lowered, prompting them to physically join the ongoing demonstrations. This outcome directly validates the empirical observations of Stamps and Mastro (2020), who highlighted the communicative efficacy of unmediated, ground-level situational reports in fostering public proximity and eliciting higher numbers of active participants during social movements.

Table 4: Hypotheses results between the independent variables and protest participation

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (Protest Participation)	
	r	P-value
Sharing Police Victimization Scenes	.742**	.001
Sharing Economic Hardship Scenarios	.387**	.228
Sharing Situational Reports	.681**	.001

Source: authors' own elaboration. Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

To address the final objective of this study regarding the fourth hypothesis (H4), a multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the relative predictive power of the independent variables on #EndSARS protest participation (Table 5). The empirical results reveal that sharing police victimisation scenes on Facebook was the most powerful predictor of protest involvement, accounting for a substantial portion of the variance ($\beta = 0.512$), or a (51.2%) relative weight. This finding aligns with Lu and Peng (2024), who established that visual evidence of state-sanctioned violence acts as a critical moral shock that rapidly elicits collective action.

Comparatively, sharing protest situational reports emerged as the second strongest predictor, yielding a 44.7% predictive weight in explaining participation. This underscores the capacity of real-time logistical updates to mobilise passive Facebook users, drawing individuals into active demonstrations which such users initially had no intention of joining. This outcome corroborates Adegbola et al. (2022), who argued that digital situational reports are potent tools for reducing informational uncertainty and shaping the operational outlook of a protest.

Conversely, sharing economic hardship scenarios exerted the weakest influence, contributing only 24.6% to the model. This minimal effect clarifies why economic hardship failed to establish a significant or positive correlation with #EndSARS participation. This nuance supports Asiamah (2024), who demonstrated that macroeconomic crises and systemic hardships are experienced differentially across developing nations where state-sponsored welfare safety nets are virtually absent. Within the Nigerian socioeconomic context, where structural economic hardship is a normalised, chronic reality rather than an acute grievance, digital exposure to hardship narratives proved insufficient to compel physical protest mobilisation compared to the visceral provocation of police brutality.

Table 4: Contribution made by each independent variable on ENDSARS Protest Participation

	Unstandardized Coefficients (B)	Std Error	Standardized Coefficients (Beta)	t	Sig
1(Constant)	6.758	1.722	-	5.080	.001
Sharing Police Victimization Scene	.50.19	.069	.512	8.244	.001
Sharing Economic Hardship Scenarios	.132	.032	.246	4.681	.001
Sharing Protest Situational Reports	.507	.067	.447	7.596	.009

However, the three independent variables jointly accounted for 61.6% of the variance in #EndSARS protest participation, as detailed in Table 6. According to standard statistical benchmarks, this indicates a substantial effect size and demonstrates strong goodness of fit for the proposed explanatory model. This high degree of explanatory power confirms that digital engagement, particularly through the processes of sharing grievances and real-time updates, serves as a robust framework for investigating modern protest dynamics. Consequently, future researchers are encouraged to replicate this model and incorporate additional psychological or structural antecedents to further enhance its predictive robustness in diverse geopolitical contexts.

Table 5: Model summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig F Change
.821 ^a	.621	.616	5.79916	.001

6. Conclusions

This study shows that social media mobilisation during the #EndSARS movement depended heavily on the specific type of content shared online. Digital exposure to police misconduct and live protest updates successfully drove people to join physical protests, while posts about economic hardship had no significant effect. This variation indicates that immediate moral shock and real-time visual proof are more powerful drivers of collective action than long-standing economic struggles, which citizens often view with fatalism. Because video and photographic evidence of police violence was the strongest factor in predicting actual protest participation, addressing the viral spread of raw crisis data is critical. Consequently, these findings suggest that relevant authorities and communication policymakers should consider structured frameworks for managing inflammatory digital media during periods of civil unrest.

This study extends framing theory by applying it to social media mobilisation during the Nigerian #EndSARS protest. The empirical data show how specific content types on Facebook, namely shared clips of police brutality and live situational updates, directly encourage users to join physical protests. Visual evidence of police violence was the most influential frame for driving citizen action. By quantitatively linking these specific digital frames to the continuation of public unrest, this research provides concrete empirical evidence showing how online media frames translate into physical protest participation.

Despite its contributions, this study has several limitations that open avenues for future inquiry. First, the analysis was restricted to three independent variables: sharing police victimisation scenes, economic hardship scenarios, and live situational reports. Future research should expand this scope by examining other potential drivers of mobilisation, such as perceived structural grievances, systemic injustice, public policy failures, institutional accountability demands, and digital influencer engagement. Second, the sample exhibited a significant female gender bias. To enhance generalisability, prospective scholars should employ diversified recruitment strategies to ensure a more balanced gender demographic. Finally, this study relied exclusively on a quantitative methodology. Future research would benefit from qualitative or mixed-methods

approaches to uncover deeper, nuanced conceptual dimensions of digital framing that quantitative metrics may fail to capture.

Acknowledgements / Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for this research.

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declare no conflict of interest.

Ethical statement

This study was conducted in accordance with the principles of scientific research and did not require additional ethics committee approval.

Declaration of AI usage

No generative AI tools were used. Grammarly was utilized strictly for conventional copy-editing and language improvement.

Data availability

The data supporting the findings of this study are available upon request.

Author contributions

	Chinedu Eugenia Anumudu	Ifeanyi Harris	Ememobong Idongesit Memfin
Conceptualization	x	x	x
Data curation	x		x
Formal analysis	x		
Funding acquisition		x	
Investigation			x
Methodology	x	x	
Project administration	x		x
Resources	x	x	
Software	x		
Supervision	x		
Validation	x	x	
Visualization	x	x	
Writing - original draft	x	x	x
Writing - review & editing	x	x	

References

- Abdullahi, I. N. U., Husin, M. H., Baharudin, A. S., & Abdullah, N. A. (2022). Determinants of Facebook adoption and its impact on service-based small and medium enterprise performance in northwestern Nigeria. *Journal of Systems and Information Technology*, 24(3), 246-267. <https://doi.org/10.1108/jsit-11-2020-0249>
- Abimbade, O., Olayoku, P., & Herro, D. (2022). Millennial activism within Nigerian Twitterscape: From obilization to social action of# ENDSARS protest. *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 6(1), 100222. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2021.100222>
- Aboh, S. C. (2024). 'It will never be well with SARS': A discourse analytic study of the# EndSARS protests on social media. *Discourse & Society*, 35(2), 153-173. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09579265231200994>
- Adegbola, O., Gearhart, S., & Cho, J. (2022). Reporting bias in coverage of Iran protests by global news agencies. *The international journal of press/politics*, 27(1), 138-157. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220966948>
- Adeniyi, E. (2022). 'We're now the Walking Dead': Predatory Policing, Youth Agency and Framing in Nigeria's #EndSARS Social Activism. *African Studies*, 81(2), 149-169. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2022.2141686>
- Agbibo, D. E. (2022). *They Eat Our Sweat: transport labor, corruption, and everyday survival in urban Nigeria*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2023.2171604>
- Aminu, P., & Chilwa, I. (2023). Reinventing identity and resistance ideology in protest narratives: The case of Oduduwa secessionist group on Facebook. *Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict*, 11(2), 200-225. <https://doi.org/10.1075/jlac.00078.ami>
- Anumudu, C. E., Yasin, M. A. I., Ghazali, A. H. A., & Alsagoff, S. A. (2021). User motive factors: The rudiments to email satisfactory communication. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 37(1). <https://doi.org/10.17576/jkmjc-2021-3701-23>
- Asiamah, T. A. (2024). Intersections between informal social and economic systems in Ghana: transformations and implications for managing economic hardship. *Cogent Arts & Humanities*, 11(1), 2303191. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2024.2303191>
- Azab, M. (2023). Social Media and Gendered Mobilization to High-Risk Campaigns in Gender- Repressive Contexts: The Case of the 2011 Egyptian Protest Movement. *Sociological Focus*, 56(3), 284-302. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00380237.2023.2216475>
- Blessing, C. O., Tunca, E. A., Talabi, F. O., Boluwatife, A. A., Oluwole, A. V., & Gever, V. C. (2021). Modeling journalists' coping strategies to occupational hazards in their coverage of protests against police brutality (ENDSARS protests) in Nigeria. *International journal of occupational safety and ergonomics*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10803548.2021.1999651>
- Bodunrin, I. A., & Matsilele, T. (2024). Social media and protest politics in Nigeria's #EndSARS campaign. In *Handbook of Social Media in Education Consumer Behavior and Politics* (pp. 109-122). Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-323-90237-3.00006-0>
- Brantly, A. F. (2019). From cyberspace to independence square: understanding the impact of social media on physical protest mobilization during Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution. *Journal of information technology & politics*, 16(4), 360-378. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2019.1657047>
- Breuer, A., Landman, T., & Farquhar, D. (2015). Social media and protest mobilization: Evidence from the Tunisian revolution. *Democratization*, 22(4), 764-792. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.885505>
- Brown, D. K., & Mourão, R. R. (2022). No reckoning for the right: How political ideology, protest tolerance and news consumption affect support Black Lives Matter protests. *Political Communication*, 39(6), 737-754. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2022.2121346>
- Bullock, O. M., & Shulman, H. C. (2021). Utilizing framing theory to design more effective health messages about tanning behavior among college women. *Communication Studies*, 72(3), 319-332. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2021.1899007>

- Dim, E. E. (2023). Media Coverage of Women's Involvement in the #EndSARS Protest Movement in Nigeria. *African Journalism Studies*, 44(1), 15-33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23743670.2023.2244551>
- Duncombe, C. (2020). Social media and the visibility of horrific violence. *International Affairs*, 96(3), 609-629. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iaa055>
- Frank, A. B., Posard, M. N., Helmus, T. C., Marcinek, K. R. Y. S. T. Y. N. A., Grana, J. U. S. T. I. N., Kahn, O., & Zutshi, R. U. S. H. I. L. (2022). *An Exploratory Examination of Agent-based Modeling for the Study of Social Movements*. RAND, National Security Research Division. <https://doi.org/10.7249/rra1646-1>
- Girardi, R. (2022). 'It's easy to mistrust police when they keep on killing us': A queer exploration of police violence and LGBTQ+ Victimization. *Journal of Gender Studies*, 31(7), 852-862. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2021.1979481>
- Harlow, S., & Brown, D. K. (2022). Perceptions versus performance: How routines, norms and values influence journalists' protest coverage decisions. *Journalism*, 23(2), 372-390. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884920983058>
- Houeland, C. (2020). Contentious and institutional politics in a petro-state: Nigeria's 2012 fuel subsidy protests. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 7(4), 1230-1237. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2020.05.010>
- Iwuoha, V. C., & Aniche, E. T. (2022). Protests and blood on the streets: Repressive state, police brutality and #EndSARS protest in Nigeria. *Security Journal*, 35(4), 1102-1124. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-021-00316-z>
- Jachimowicz, J. M., Szaszi, B., Lukas, M., Smerdon, D., Prabhu, J., & Weber, E. U. (2020). Higher economic inequality intensifies the financial hardship of people living in poverty by fraying the community buffer. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 4(7), 702-712. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0849-2>
- Jungkunz, S. (2024). Asymmetric polarization by vaccination status identification during the COVID-19 pandemic. *PloS one*, 19(11), e0311962. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0311962>
- Kairouz, A., & Dagher, W. A. L. I. D. (2020). The impact of social media upon the Lebanese revolution of October 17, 2019. *Int. J. Mech. Prod. Eng. Res. Dev*, 10, 7737-7748. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370596845>
- Kamaruzzaman, K. (2022). Considering the Symbiotic Relationship Between Religion, Digital Media, and Social Movement Leadership—A Systematic Review Using PRISMA. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 38(3), 209-227. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2022-3803-13>
- Kim, J. (2020). How Internet content mobilizes protests: The case of two anti-government protests in Korea. *Social science computer review*, 38(4), 443-461. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439318823512>
- Kim, D. (2023). Media consumption effects on college students' perceived risk of victimization and fear of crime: Does the usage of social media police scanners alter public perceptions of safety?. <https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/4060>
- Kuan, D., Hasan, N. A. M., Zawawi, J. W. M., & Abdullah, Z. (2021). Framing theory application in public relations: The lack of dynamic framing analysis in competitive context. *Media Watch*, 12(2), 333-351. <https://doi.org/10.15655/mw/2021/v12i2/160155>
- Kumari, S. K. V., Lavanya, K., Vidhya, V., Premila, G. A. D. J. S., & Lawrence, B. (2023). *Research methodology* (Vol. 1). Darshan Publishers. ISBN: 978-9386739643.
- Kwak, J. (2022). Measuring and analyzing protest potential from a survey data recycling framework. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 66(4), 434-458. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642211021626>
- Labben, A. (2022). "As Tunisian I feel ashamed by this disgusting presenter": Collective face threat and identity positioning on Facebook. *Discourse, Context & Media*, 48, Q 100619.
- Lakens, D., Adolphi, F. G., Albers, C. J., Anvari, F., Apps, M. A., Argamon, S. E., & Zwaan, R. A. (2018). Justify your alpha. *Nature human behaviour*, 2(3), 168-171. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0311-x>

- Lavender, A., & Peetz, J. (2022). On protest. *Performance Research*, 27(3-4), 1-12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13528165.2022.2155388>
- Lee, S., & Ahmed, S. (2024). Social media in black lives matter movement: amplifying or reducing gaps in protest participation?. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, 21(4), 393-409. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2023.2223210>
- Lu, Y., & Peng, Y. (2024). The mobilizing power of visual media across stages of social-mediated protests. *Political Communication*, 41(4), 531-558. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2024.2317951>
- Maradun, L. U., Yar'Adua, S. M., & Msughter, A. E. (2021). Perceived value of social media in the #EndSARS' protest in Nigeria. *International Journal of English Literature and Culture*, 9(3), 69-80. <https://doi.org/10.14662/IJELC2021.075>
- Mercea, D., Santos, F. G., & Hoffmann, M. (2024). Actual, potential, and non-participants: Advancing the differential analysis of protest participation. *Political Studies*, 00323217241297905. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241297905>
- Miller, J., & Ulrich, R. (2019). The quest for an optimal alpha. *PloS one*, 14(1), e0208631. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0208631>
- Nwafor, K. A., & Nwabuzor, M. N. (2021). Social media and youths engagements and mobilisation for the 2020# EndSARS Protests in Nigeria. *Ebonyi State University Journal of Mass Communication*, 8(1), 13-24. https://www.ebsujmc.com/uploads/233480_1628616029.pdf
- Oana, I. E., Kriesi, H., & Altiparmakis, A. (2024). Dynamics of protest mobilisation in the European poly-crisis. *Journal of European public policy*, 1-32. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2366388>
- Obia, V. (2023). Regulatory annexation: Extending broadcast media regulation to social media and internet content. *Communication Law and Policy*, 28(2), 99-123. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2023.2206382>
- Olagunju, A., Frankish, T., & Wade, J. P. (2022). Beyond #FeesMustFall: Understanding the inclusion role of social media during students' protests in South Africa. *Cogent Education*, 9(1), 2047316. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2331186x.2022.2047316>
- Olaitan, Z. M. (2024). Women of EndSars: Understanding women's participation in protests in Nigeria. *The International Journal of Law and Politics*, 2, 25-49.
- Olanrewaju, M. M., Sanusi, B. O., Ajala, A. O., & Oluwasanmi, O. P. (2024). Social media and youth mobilisation during the End SARS protest. *IMSU Journal of Communication Studies*, 8(1), 164-174. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12694044>
- Olzak, S. (2021). Does protest against police violence matter? Evidence from US Cities, 1990 through 2019. *American sociological review*, 86(6), 1066-1099. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224211056966>
- Omeni, A. (2022). Framing injustice: Special anti-robbery squads (SARS) in Nigeria and the #EndSARS' protest response from a social movement theory perspective. *Modern Africa*. 9-32. <https://doi.org/10.26806/modafr.v10i2.409>
- Sarstedt, M., Hair Jr, J. F., Cheah, J. H., Becker, J. M., & Ringle, C. M. (2019). How to specify, estimate, and validate higher-order constructs in PLS-SEM. *Australasian marketing journal*, 27(3), 197-211. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ausmj.2019.05.003>
- Scherman, A., & Rivera, S. (2021). Social media use and pathways to protest participation: evidence from the 2019 Chilean social outburst. *Social Media+ Society*, 7(4), <https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051211059704>
- Simmler, M., Stempkowski, M., & Markwalder, N. (2021). Punitive attitudes and victimization among police officers in Switzerland: an empirical exploration. *Police practice and research*, 22(2), 1191-1208. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2019.1697264>
- Stamps, D., & Mastro, D. (2020). The problem with protests: Emotional effects of race-related news media. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 97(3), 617-643. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699019891433>

- Stanek, K. A., Fox, K. A., Telep, C. W., & Trinkner, R. (2023). Who can you trust? The impact of procedural justice, trust, and police officer sex on women's sexual assault victimization reporting likelihood. *Violence against women*, 29(5), 860-881. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012221097139>
- Stinson, P. M., Wentzlof, C. A., Liederbach, J., & Brewer, S. L. (2021). Racial Disparities in Police Crime Victimization. *Social Sciences*, 10(8), 287. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10080287>
- Sun, S., Chen, Y. C., Ansong, D., Huang, J., & Sherraden, M. S. (2022). Household financial capability and economic hardship: An empirical examination of the financial capability framework. *Journal of family and economic issues*, 43(4), 716-729.. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10834-022-09816-5>
- Susánszky, P., Kopper, Á., & Zsigó, F. T. (2022). Media framing of political protests—reporting bias and the discrediting of political activism. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 38(4), 312-328. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2022.2061817>
- Taha, M. (2023). Social Media Use in the Sudanese Uprising, 2018: Mediating Civilian-Military Discourse. In *Decolonizing Data* (pp. 34-61). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003299912-3>
- Uakarn, C., Chaokromthong, K., & Sintao, N. (2021). Sample size estimation using Yamane and Cochran and Krejcie and Morgan and Green formulas and Cohen statistical power analysis by G* power and comparisons. *Apheit Int J*, 10(2), 76-88. <https://so04.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/ATI/article/view/254253>
- Ugochukwu, C. C., & Nwolu, O. J. (2021). The influence of social media framing on audience perception of EndSars agenda protest. *Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of Communication and Media Studies*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.47851/naujocommed.v2i1.119>
- Urman, A., Ho, J. C. T., & Katz, S. (2021). Analyzing protest mobilization on Telegram: The case of 2019 anti-extradition bill movement in Hong Kong. *Plos one*, 16(10), e0256675. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256675>
- Uwalaka, T., Joe, S., Amadi, F. A., & Amadi, C. C. (2023). Online activism and connective mourning: Na examination of the #EndSARS Memorial protests in Nigeria. *Journal of Communication Inquiry*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01968599231190112>
- Uwalaka, T., & Nwala, B. (2023). Examining the role of social media and mobile social networking applications in socio-political contestations in Nigeria. *Communication and the Public*, 8(3), 175-190. <https://doi.org/10.1177/20570473231168474>
- Uwalaka, T. (2023). Mobile internet and contentious politics in Nigeria: Using the organizational tools of mobile social networking applications to sustain protest movements. *Journalism and Media*, 4(1), 396-412. <https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia4010026>
- Valenzuela, S., Correa, T., & de Zúñiga, H. G. (2020). Ties, likes, and tweets: Using strong and weak ties to explain differences in protest participation across Facebook and Twitter use. In *Studying Politics Across Media* (pp. 117-134). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429202483-7>
- Xu, Z., & Zhang, M. (2024). How news media visually dehumanize victims of humanitarian crises through framing disparities: A quantitative comparative analysis. *International Communication Gazette*, 86(8), 633-654. <https://doi.org/10.1177/17480485231216583>
- Zharima, C., Singh, R., Closson, K., Beksinska, M., Zulu, B., Jesson, J., ... & Basham, C. A. (2024). Economic hardship and perpetration of intimate partner violence by young men in South Africa during the COVID-19 pandemic (2021–2022): a cross-sectional study. *Injury epidemiology*, 11(1), 2. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40621-024-00483-8>
- Jensen, K. B. (2020). *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies* (3rd ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781138492905>
- Shoemaker, P. J. & Vos, T. (2009). *Gatekeeping Theory*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203931653>