Modeling Social Media Effects on Non-Electoral Participation in Morocco

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Abstract

This paper seeks to examine the indirect effects of social media among Moroccan citizens on non-electoral participation using the wave V data of the Arab barometer. The wave V of this data was obtained in 2019-2018 by surveying 2400 Moroccan citizens. Using the SEM, the results of testing the hypotheses indicate that, first of all, social media has a direct and significant positive effect on poor government performance and corruption perception among citizens. Second, the results point out that social media indirectly and significantly increases political distrust among individuals through poor government performance and corruption perception. Finally, the results show that political distrust significantly increases non-electoral participation. Thus, given the significance of all relationships in the research model, it can be argued that social media has significantly increased non-electoral participation among citizens.

Keywords: Social Media, Corruption perception, Poor government performance, Political distrust, Non-electoral participation.

Introduction

Using information and communication technology (ICT) has grown widely in the MENA. One of the most important reasons for the tendency of the people of these countries to adopt new media in recent years is the limitations and limits imposed by governments on any form of opinion and criticism of the government and statesmen, the policy of control and the monopoly of the media (this means that it is impossible to express dissent through newspapers, radio and television in these countries) and to prohibit any gathering (Angrist, 2010). In modern contexts, maintaining an authoritarian political system depends partly on the regime's ability to control and manipulate political information. Media control allows the regime to create and reinforce positive perceptions of the government and to remove access to dissenting information and attitudes (Oates 2013). With the advent of social media, there has been a revolution in communication technology for individuals to exchange information and disseminate their ideas and ideas in a new environment, far from the constraints imposed by government (Schillinger, 2011). The new online media provides a forum for alternative views as well as a news stream that endorses and reinforces opposing attitudes. Issues such as the lack of individual freedoms, dire economic conditions, high unemployment, increased corruption and violent behavior by citizens at the hands of security forces are among the issues raised on social media (Aman & Jayroe, 2013). As a result, social media provides the opportunity structure for information flow that can incite distrust of the government, threaten legitimacy, and ultimately encourage

protest (Bekmagambetov, et al. 2018). Social media overcomes institutional, judicial, temporal, and legal constraints, resulting in improved information exchange, communication practices and resources, and enhanced citizenship and democratic participation (Kavada, 2015). These features make social media particularly effective in exposing social injustice and sparking social movement and collective action against the monopoly of public power in movements such as the Arab Spring Movement (Pang & Goh, 2016). Protesters in these countries have shown the economic inefficiency of the government and the injustice and corruption in these countries with the help of new media and increased public awareness of opposition to the ruling system. The media has also provided a tool for organizing, anti-government protests (Howard, 2011). Therefore, from the perspective of this research, ICT is an effective tool to accelerate, facilitate and strengthen the path of political and social change in Morocco. The role of social media was very influential in the demonstrations organized by the February 7th movement in Morocco. Protesters calling for freedom, equality, genuine democracy, social justice and dignity for Morocco used social media to communicate tightly, communicate on the Internet, and publish video on the web (Brouwer & Bartels, 2014).

It is argued that critical information about the economic inefficiency and corruption of the government that people see on social media is read and shared online undermines their trust in political institutions, which threatens the diminished political trust of the ruling regime's legitimacy and protests. At this stage, social media is being used as available for political mobilization. Within a despotic regime, access to social media is a powerful tool for a social movement. Given this, the structure of this article is as follows: in the first section, the theoretical approach to studying the effects of social media on protest behavior is examined. Next, the data and the method used to perform the empirical analysis are described. In the next step, after presenting and interpreting the results of the tested models, the significance of the research findings are discussed. Finally, the results are summarized and some questions and suggestions for future research are provided.

Protest movements in Morocco

Morocco is a monarchical constitutional government in which a dual administrative system influenced by the French colonial heritage has been established. The main features of Morocco's political system are complex: a multi-party electoral system with less overt electoral fraud and a government that reflects a parliamentary majority, with a monarchy that makes all major political decisions (Khakee, 2017). The social and political changes that have gripped Morocco over the past few decades have succeeded in empowering large sections of the country's population. Many stereotypes have disappeared, and young people and women have become the necessary drivers of political and civic change. The uprisings that swept across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 demonstrated the revolutionary potential of young people in the face of social injustice and political repression in Morocco (Bahmad, 2019). On February 20, 2011, thousands of protesters took to the streets demanding social justice and political reform in Morocco. The socio-economic demands of the 20F movement were focused on dissatisfaction with low wages, the rising cost of living, poverty and deprivation, and the demand for corruption and inequality and justice. On the other hand, the political demands were for constitutional changes to strengthen democracy, expand the rule of law, and change the political system to a constitutional monarchy (Molina, 2011). Unlike in other Arab countries, the 20F protesters did not call for the fall of the regime but rather focused on ending tyranny, injustice and the fight against corruption (Benshemsi, 2012). In response to the developments of the Arab Spring in 2011, Shah

Muhammad VI began several reforms. The new constitution, passed by referendum in 2011, promised to bring about some structural changes. A new decentralization reform lay the foundations for a participatory, transparent, and efficient political and executive system (Houdret & Harnisch, 2019). The king's speech caused a rift in the movement. It exposed ideological contradictions between protesters and separated non-partisan youth, traditional opposition, the radical left, moderate Islamists and radical fundamentalists from the 20F movement. This separation led to a reduction in organized demonstrations (Belghazi & Moudden, 2016). These constitutional amendments were the intended result of the suppression of the protest movement. Since October 2016, Morocco has faced another wave of protests. These include riots in the northern region (known as the al-Hirak) denouncing Al-hogra (humiliation), thirst protests against water shortages in the south, protests against social exclusion in the border town of Jerada, and in the coastal town of Sidi Ifni. There have also been regular sit-ins in front of parliament by the unemployed and women activists, contract school teachers, and nurses (Graiouid, 2020). The death of a fishmonger, Mohcine Fikri, on October 28, 2016, inside a garbage truck sparked violent protests in the Rif area and elsewhere after local authorities confiscated his fish cargo that day. Moroccan protesters escalated protests leading to widespread arrests of protesters in the Rif, including its leader Nasser Zafzafi and 22 others in May 2017 (Masbah, 2018). A 2018 boycott campaign aimed at selecting products for national and multinational corporations, including a gas station, a subsidiary of a French dairy company, and the largest national mineral water company, showed economic dissatisfaction and public discontent (Masbah, 2018). These social protests call for social and economic reforms to improve people's living conditions and condemn marginalization and regional inequalities. Thus, most of these protests focus on dissatisfaction with social services, such as education and health care, electricity and drinking water. At the same time, they show the inability of elected representative institutions to meet citizens' expectations and the failure of public policies and government development projects to improve the socio-economic status and reduce inequality. It emphasizes the deep distrust of the formal political process and the disappearance of the role of political parties as a credible mediator between the state and society. It explains the shift in protests from social demands to political claims. (Masbah, 2018). Social media played a key role in the popular uprisings that swept across North Africa and the Middle East after 2011. Various actors in the uprisings have used social media - from Twitter via YouTube to Facebook and Instagram-for various effects. They allowed protesters to mobilize and organize street protests in highly repressive countries. However, it is wrong to assume that social media was the main factor behind these uprisings. These media helped both activate and strengthen the impact of events, but they were by no means the main cause of the uprisings (Bahmad, 2019). Social media allowed the protest movement to hear the voices of marginalized groups and youth. Facebook became a tool for planning the F20 protests and releasing a video of the movement and a platform to express its most urgent demands. The strategic goal of the Facebook page was to gain the support of Moroccan public opinion with the following: (1) persuading people to join the page and read the posts; (2) getting them to interact with the content by clicking the "Like" or Comment button; (3) directing them to carry out their activities on the street. However, although the use of Facebook certainly did not create protests, it did shape their organization (Radi, 2017). In 2018, the Moroccan boycott movement began via Facebook, WhatsApp, and other social media under the hashtag "Let it speak," "Say no to high prices." By the end of May 2018, the scope of sanctions extended to fish markets due to high prices, and the "Let them rot" and "Let them swim" hashtags were used. The strategic use of social media was an effective tool in the boycott campaign

because it was almost impossible to control them and the people behind the campaign remained anonymous. As a convenient platform for expanding the call for sanctions, Facebook provided the possibility of "free speech" at the lowest cost (Masbah, 2018).

Literature review

The role of "new communication technologies" such as the Internet, mobile phones, and social media in empowering citizens, enhancing their participation in the political process, facilitating communication and mobilizing social issues and empowering them has been widely documented (Saleh, 2012). Research has consistently shown that the use of information on the Internet leads to greater political participation (Boulianne, 2015) and social media offers many opportunities for political action: such as online polling, discussion, blogging, and more (Ward & Vedel, 2006). On the other hand, "new media" reduces the cost of action. New media has eliminated the barriers to citizen participation by removing the extra costs (Best & Krueger, 2005). As a result, it provides individuals with equal opportunities for political action (Strandberg, 2006). The effective role of new social media appears when the only way to express opposition to and contradict authoritarian governments' policies is far from any restraint and self-censorship by political activists (Howard, 2011). The free flow of information adds to the transparency and monitoring capabilities of the community (Dutta & Roy, 2016). The free dissemination of information enables the voices and voices of poor people and the masses to be voiced, and people in the role of observers can play a role in promoting economic transparency, men's government accountability, and highlighting corruption and government inefficiency.

Previous studies have suggested the effect of social media on increasing perceptions of corruption and economic inefficiency of government. It is clear that corruption is a major social challenge that has involved most governments (Chattacherjee & Shrivastava, 2018). The media plays an important regulatory role for democratic countries and holds the government accountable for reporting corruption, abuse of power, and other misconduct by government officials. Speeches on social media can lead to the recognition of injustice and government corruption and to agreeing to one's goals. Protest the movement that supports the mobilization process. (Lee et al., 2017). Jha and Sarangi's (2017) study of the impact of social media on corruption using datasets from more than 5 countries around the world showed that Facebook's influence has a significant negative effect on corruption.

Theoretically, social media enhances the perception of government corruption and exposes economic inefficiency and has the potential to reduce corruption in the following ways. First, transparency has been widely recognized as an important cure for corruption (Nam, 2018). Social media enhances transparency and creates greater monitoring power (Jha & Sarangi, 2017). Second, social media reduce the cost of combating corruption. Social media can play a vital role in combating corruption, sparking citizens to participate in social movements and collective actions against the monopoly of public power (Pang & Goh, 2016; Starke et al., 2016). Tang, et al. (2015) shows that greater use of social media is positively associated with stronger control of corruption and is moderated by cultural concepts that using social media has a stronger impact on reducing corruption in free cultures than closed cultures. So the first research hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Social media enhances corruption perceptions and Evaluations of poor government performance by citizens.

The process of corruption and economic inefficiency creates a negative spiral in which citizens show skepticism and distrust of officials, political management and democracy as a whole, which in turn results in political indifference to voters (Kostadinova 2009). Trust in the government is a vital indicator of democratic health because it enables governments to cope with difficult political problems. In most cases, current politicians and parties lose their popularity when they think of corruption or in fact accuse it of corruption. However, its effects are conditional on transparency and media exposure to corrupt practices (Costas-Pe´rez, Sole´-Olle´a, & Sorribas-Navarro 2012). Warren (2004) show that corruption festers the political system, leading to general distrust, and indifference to voters (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Seligson, (2002) shows that exposure to corruption has a negative impact on political trust. Dalton (2004) believes that by reducing political trust, citizens' organizational and electoral participation can be weakened. Decreasing political trust in political institutions can dramatically reduce the legitimacy and stability of institutions (Denemark & Niemi, 2012). Ziller and Schübel, (2015) indicate that exposure to corruption reduces political trust, which in turn leads to a greater tendency to vote for a right-wing radical party. However, since the electoral environment means free existence in undemocratic countries, it does not lead to citizens' tendency for unconventional political protest and participation. Therefore, using the theoretical and empirical literature of research, hypothesis 2 can be formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 2: Social media indirectly increases the level of political distrust through the mediating variables corruption perceptions and poor government performance.

Citizens need political trust to participate in politics. Ikeda (2014) points out that citizens who have a high level of institutional trust through political participation, including active voting, participate in Mitigating, signatures of protest and support, can raise their trusted ruling group to power. According to Haugsgjerd and Kumlin (2019) poor government performance undermines political trust, which in turn makes assessments of future government performance worse. Increases in citizens' dissatisfaction lead to more distrust over time and initial dissatisfaction leads to subsequent downward changes in trust. When the political system is generally considered to be unreliable, citizens may feel compelled to intervene in political participation. In this regard, Barnes et al. (1979) state that political distrust in democratic societies often results in bohemian partnerships. Rudolph (2017) shows that political trust acts as a decision-making rule that enables people to easily judge government policies and actions. Accordingly, based on the theoretical discussion above, we put forward hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Political distrust increases Non-Electoral participation.

There are two different approaches to the role of social media in protesting partnerships. On the one hand, Lerner (2010) and Morozov (2009) doubt that social media is the main driver of popular upheaval. Lerner (2010) takes a very skeptical stance, arguing that the Internet offers no solution to the threats that social movements face and emphasizes that blogs and websites are in no way involved in the democratization of

the country because Anti-democratic forces and the government also have access to information and communication technologies. In contrast, many studies such as Shirky (2011) and Patrut and Stoica (2019) show that social media has had a great effect on protest political activity. Jurgenson (2012) states that social media organizes actions and distributes news; however, the goals of the protest come from the outside world (such as education, health care, economic inefficiency, and corruption). Bekmagambetov, et al. (2018) argues that the effect of social media on citizens' attitudes is influenced not by their existence but by enabling the provision of information that is inconsistent with traditional narrative in traditional media. In a despotic regime, rather than the social media being a direct cause of distrust and protest, social media is the conduit for the flow of information that can stimulate these attitudes by reducing trust in the government. Patrut and Stoica (2019) points to the link between political corruption and distrust of the government and subsequently the role of social media in launching protest movements. It shows that social networks have played an important role in organizing Romanian political protests.

Valenzuela (2013) found that the effects of social media for networking (joining reasons) and political expression are important predictors of protest participation. Della Porta and Mosca (2005) believe that social media (a) is a rationale available to some mass activists who did not previously have it, (b) allows for the organization and expression of claims, (c) informs and sensitizes the public, and (d) facilitates collective action processes. According to the "resource mobilization theory", Breuer et al. (2015) show that social media has allowed a "digital elite" to break the silence of national media by exchanging information for mainstream media. It provided the basis for inter-group collaboration for a large "protest cycle" and provided more "emotional mobilization" by showing the worst atrocities related to a regime's response to the protests. Accordingly, the forth research hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 4: Social media increases Non-Electoral participation.

Methodology

Data and method

The analysis uses data collected through Wave V (2018 - 2019) of the Arab Barometer Project, conducted in collaboration with the Universities of Michigan, Princeton, and other universities and research centers in the MENA region (www. arabbarometer.org). the Arab Barometer data includes a survey of attitudinal and behavioral attitudes, especially in the political, cultural and social spheres, of citizens of Arab countries in wave V of 12 countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen).

The latest wave of Arab barometer data, based on which the present study was conducted, has surveyed 26,780 citizens of the twelve aforementioned Arab countries. The Moroccan citizens who contributed to the data are 2,400. In the statistical sample obtained from Morocco, 50% were male and 50% female, ranging in age from 18 to 95 years. In terms of education, 17.4% were illiterate, 16.8% held elementary education, 14.3% basic education, 17.1% secondary education, 14.1% tertiary education, 12.3% bachelor education, and 8% education higher than Masters. In addition, 14.8% of the respondents were not able to afford living expenses, 34.6% had difficulty to manage their living expenses, and 31.9% could afford their own living expenses. 18.7% of the people could save money in their lives. Finally, these data were collected from

various Moroccan cities and villages, with 86.7% of the study population being Sunni, 12.1% being merely a Muslim, and the rest being from other religions.

In the present study, SEM, run in AMOS, was employed to analyze the data and test hypotheses. SEM predicts a set of multiple regression equations by specifying the SEM used in AMOS and is therefore more accurate for testing hypotheses than linear regression used in SPSS. Also, given that the research hypotheses address the indirect effects of public corruption perceptions on political distrust and support for political Islamism, the SEM method can test hypotheses better than other methods.

Measurement of variables

1. Social media usage: A five-item item was used to measure social media use including: How many hours on a typical day do you spend on social media platforms? (1= Not at all, 5= 10 hours or more, mean= 2.61)

2. Corruption Perceptions: the variable corruption perceptions was measured through a 4-point Likert scale through respondents' self-evaluations. In this regard, two items were used to measure perceptions of corruption: (1) To what extent do you think that there is corruption within the national state agencies and institutions in your country? (1= To a large extent, 4= Not at all, Mean= 1.91) [reversed]; (2) How widespread do you think corruption is in your local / municipal government? (1= Hardly anyone is involved, 4= Almost everyone is corrupt, Mean= 2.62). The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for this variable is 0.685.

3. Evaluations of poor government performance: four items were used to measure government performance in which the citizens' assesses the current performance of the government in his country in the following ways: (1) Creating employment opportunities (1= Very good, 4= Very bad, Mean= 3.09); (2) Narrowing the gap between rich and poor (1= Very good, 4= Very bad, Mean= 3.11); (3) Providing security and order (1= Very good, 4= Very bad, Mean= 2.25), and (4) Keeping priced down (1= Very good, 4= Very bad, Mean= 3.17). The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for this variable is 0.660.

4. Political distrust: In this study, political distrust is the lack of trust in political institutions, which were measured on 4 items by a 4-point Likert scale. In this regard, respondents were asked how much they trust the following institutions: (1) Government (Council of Ministers) (1= A great deal of trust, 4= No trust at all, Mean= 3.40); (2) Courts and legal system (1= A great deal of trust, 4= No trust at all, Mean= 2.88); (3) The elected council of representatives (the parliament) (1= A great deal of trust, 4= No trust at all, Mean= 3.59); and (4) Local government (1= A great deal of trust, 4= No trust at all, Mean= 3.19). The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for this variable is 0.683.

5. Non-Electoral Participation: The non-electoral participation variable was measured by citizens' participation degree via the following 3 items on a 3-point Likert scale: (1) Meeting/Petition (1= never, 3= more than once, Mean= 1.36); (2) Protest (1= never, 3= more than once, Mean= 1.45); (3) Use Force for Political Cause (1= never, 3= more than once, Mean= 1.10). The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for this variable is 0.741.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between the variables

|	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.Age	1.000								
2.Gender (female)	**0.187**	1.000							
3.Education	**-0.552**	**-0.237**	1.000						
4.Income situation	-0.004	**-0.048**	**-0.288**	1.000					
5.Social media	**-0.639**	**-0.217**	**0.721**	**0.157**	1.000				
6.Corruption perception	**-0.322**	**-0.250**	**.196**	**-0.234**	**.215**	1.000			
7.Poor government performance	**-0.316**	**-0.176**	**.131**	**-0.323**	**0.239**	**0.586**	1.000		
8.Political distrust	**-0.347**	**-0.253**	**.224**	**-0.241**	**0.263**	**0.667**	**0.688**	1.000	
9.Non-electoral participation	**-.160**	**-.240**	**.333**	0.100	**0.256**	**0.197**	**0.162**	**0.208**	1.000
Mean	39.02	1.50	3.62	2.54	3.70	2.85	2.91	2.79	1.30
Standard deviation	15.87	0.50	1.89	0.95	2.11	0.74	0.58	0.74	0.47

Notes: bold numbers indicate a significant relationship between scores ($p < 0.05$)

Table 1 provides a breakdown of the preliminary correlations between the study variables. According to the results, except for age and gender, other variables had a significant relationship with political distrust. While democracy had a negative relationship with political distrust, there was a relationship between education level, income status, perception of corruption, poor government performance, a negative impression of the future of the country with positive political distrust. The results also show that women were more inclined to political Islamism than men. But the relationship between education levels, perceptions of corruption, poor government performance, negative perceptions of the country's future, and political distrust have been negatively correlated with political Islamism.

Hypotheses testing

The research hypotheses were tested by Amos graphics, the results of which are reported below.

Figure 1: Specified SEM shows unstandardized path coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Note: This theoretical model was also bootstrapped based on the standard errors with 1,000 iterations and with a 95% trust interval.

Figure 1 presents the empirical model of the research in the form of structural equation modeling. Regarding the goodness of fit and coefficients of the model, it should be said that the research model has a relatively good fit and the data collected support the theoretical framework of the research: (Model GOF: CMIN = 0.599, DF = 1 , P = 0.439, CMIN / DF = 0.599, RMSEA = 0.000; PCLOSE = 0.954, CFI = 1.00, GFI = 1.00, AGFI = .999, TLI = .987, RFI = .998). Also, in this figure, the non-standard path coefficients and standard error represent the strength of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables in the model.

Table 2. Direct and indirect standardized effects on dependent variables

	poor government performance	corruption perception	political distrust		non-electoral participation	
	Direct		Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect
S.M	0.251***	0.208***		0.191***		0.027**
P.G.P			0.425***			0.061***
C.P			0.406***			0.058***
D.T					0.144***	
R^2	0.06	0.04	0.57		0.04	

Notes: *$p < 0.05$ **$p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$. In this study: S.M= Social media; P.G.P= poor government performance; C.P= corruption perception; D.T= political distrust.

Table 3 examines the direct and indirect effects of the research variables. The SEM results indicate that on the one hand, social media consumption had a significant positive effect on poor government performance (β = 0.25, p <0.01). Besides, social media usage had a significant effect on increasing corruption perception among citizens (β = 0.20, p <0.01). The positive and significant effect of poor government performance and corruption perception variables on increasing political mistrust among individuals indicates that the use of social media indirectly and significantly increases citizens' political mistrust (β = 0.19, p <.01). The Sobel test results also indicate a significant indirect effect of social media consumption on political distrust. Finally, the results of the structural equation test indicate that political distrust has a positive and significant effect on non-electoral participation and increases this type of political participation among citizens (β = 0.02, p <0.05). Thus, given the importance of all relationships among variables, it can be argued that social media indirectly had a significant effect on increasing non-electoral participation among citizens.

Conclusions

Morocco is located in a region where there has been widespread political instability in recent years, so that these political protests may alter governments, internal turmoil or carry out economic and political reforms in these countries. Therefore, given the significance of this issue, it is of utmost importance to consider the context of the formation and reasons for the transformation of political participation from electoral to non-electoral practices. Accordingly, as noted in the theoretical section of the study, one of the main reasons for the proliferation of non-electoral methods of political participation among citizens is social media, which makes the process of mobilizing protest movements easier to make contact easier. Facilitate like-minded people and the widespread dissemination of socio-economic information and awareness in society. Therefore, this study examines the impact of social media on non-electoral participation through the mediating variables of poor government performance, corruption perception, and political distrust.

The results, consistent with the views of Starke et al. (2016), Tang et al. (2019), and Valenzuela (2013), show that social media can lead to a perception of corruption, poor government performance, and political mistrust. Increase the citizens. This shows that the Internet and social media have directly and indirectly increased curiosity about political and social issues in Morocco in the context of developments in Morocco's education and urbanization system. In addition, social media, by dynamically and critically enhancing the media arena, provides the basis for the formation of political discontent and distrust among citizens. In other words, as Howard (2011) argue, in many authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries, the situation is such that traditional media is largely controlled by governments and therefore opposition groups have great access to mass media. This issue makes these groups turn to social media. Thus, as opposition groups congregate in various social media groups and channels, anti-government political content in such media is gradually becoming more prominent. The emergence of a kind of digital public sphere within social media makes it difficult for citizens to freely question the policies and practices of governments and to report any abuses and corruption within the existing political system.

Consistent with the theories of Haugsgjerd and Kumlin (2019), the findings of this study also show that with increasing corruption perception and poor government performance, citizens' trust in political institutions is reduced. Political distrust is a mental construct that is influenced by many extrinsic variables, and it seems

that, as the research findings and findings confirm, the functioning of governments can have a profound effect on citizens' political trust. Of course, there has been a lot of research on the negative impact of poor government performance on political trust, but this research shows that its perception can also influence the spread of political distrust. In other words, human beings often adjust their political behavior based on their attitudes and mentality, and this study shows that social media indirectly, through negative perceptions of performance the socio-economic rule of the government reduces citizens' trust in political institutions.

Finally, the results consistent with Valenzuela's (2013) findings suggest that social media can indirectly increase non-electoral participation among citizens by increasing political distrust. Therefore, over the past few years, information and communication technology, including social media, has played a prominent role in the activities of social movements. Although the main reasons for the Moroccans' anger and discontent over the inefficiency of the government cannot be denied, nor can the social, political, economic context of the movements and revolutions be ignored, what we have highlighted here is the use of new tools and technologies in modern political protests that, given their rapid and widespread role in disseminating news and information, make people's perceptions of inefficiency and Affect the political corruption in the country. Social media is seen as an important tool for social action and social change. Facebook and WhatsApp and other applications are emerging options for new groups and political forces to emerge in civil society, as is the case in Morocco.

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